Privacy through security: policy and practice in a small-medium enterprise. by Allison, Ian & Strangwick, Craig
Computer Security, 
Privacy, and Politics:
Current Issues, Challenges, 
and Solutions
Ramesh Subramanian
Quinnipiac University, USA
Hershey • New York
IRM Press
Publisher of innovative scholarly and professional 
information technology titles in the cyberage
Acquisition Editor:  Kristin Klinger
Development Editor:  Kristin Roth
Senior Managing Editor: Jennifer Neidig
Managing Editor:  Jamie Snavely
Assistant Managing Editor: Carole Coulson
Copy Editor:  Jennifer Young
Typesetter:   Larissa Vinci
Cover Design:  Lisa Tosheff
Printed at:   Yurchak Printing Inc.
Published in the United States of America by 
IRM Press (an imprint of IGI Global)
701 E. Chocolate Avenue, Suite 200
Hershey PA 17033-1240
Tel: 717-533-8845
Fax:  717-533-8661
E-mail: cust@igi-global.com
Web site: http://www.irm-press.com
and in the United Kingdom by
IRM Press  (an imprint of IGI Global)
3 Henrietta Street
Covent Garden
London WC2E 8LU
Tel: 44 20 7240 0856
Fax:  44 20 7379 0609
Web site: http://www.eurospanonline.com
Copyright © 2008 by IGI Global.  All rights reserved.  No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or 
by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without written permission from the publisher.
Product or company names used in this book are for identification purposes only. Inclusion of the names of 
the products or companies does not indicate a claim of ownership by IGI Global of the trademark or registered 
trademark.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Computer security, privacy, and politics : current issues, challenges and solutions / Ramesh Subramanian, editor.
       p. cm.
  Summary: “This book offers a review of recent developments of computer security, focusing on the relevance 
and implications of global privacy, law, and politics for society, individuals, and corporations.It compiles timely 
content on such topics as reverse engineering of software, understanding emerging computer exploits, emerg-
ing lawsuits and cases, global and societal implications, and protection from attacks on privacy”--Provided by 
publisher.
  Includes bibliographical references and index.
  ISBN-13: 978-1-59904-804-8 (hardcover)
  ISBN-13: 978-1-59904-806-2 (e-book)
 1.  Computer security. 2.  Computer networks--Security measures. 3.  Computer security--Government policy.  
I. Subramanian, Ramesh. 
  QA76.9.A25C6557 2008
  005.8--dc22
                                                            2007037717
British Cataloguing in Publication Data
A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.
All work contributed to this book is original material. The views expressed in this book are those of the authors, 
but not necessarily of the publisher.
Privacy through Security 
Copyright © 2008, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission         
of IGI Global is prohibited.
Chapter.VIII
Privacy.through.Security:
Policy.and.Practice.in.a.
Small-Medium.Enterprise
Ian Allison, The Robert Gordon University, UK
Craig Strangwick, ABC Awards Ltd, UK
Abstract
The chapter discusses how one small business planned for, and implemented, the 
security of its data in a new enterprise-wide system. The company’s data was per-
ceived as sensitive, and any breach of privacy as commercially critical. From this 
perspective, the chapter outlines the organizational and technical facets of the poli-
cies and practices evidenced. Lessons for other businesses can be drawn from the 
case by recognizing the need for investments to be made that will address threats in 
business critical areas. By highlighting the need for organizations to understand the 
nature of the risk and the probability of an event occurring, the security approaches 
highlight the need to address both the threats and actions in the event of an incident 
to reduce the risk to privacy.
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Introduction.
Privacy often is discussed in the literature as an ethical issue, whereby members 
of society are perceived to have a right to privacy and that right is considered to be 
eroded through the application of information technology. The Internet and support-
ing architectures are considered to make privacy more vulnerable because behaviour 
can be monitored, personal data can be commodified and exchanged, and data can 
be combined from different sources to enable analysis of individuals’ records (e.g. 
Spinello, 2006; Tavani, 2004). The invasion of privacy is seen to occur through the 
access to, and control of, personal information. 
Consequently, debates in the literature focus on what we understand privacy to be, 
the degree to which privacy can be taken as a right, to what degree privacy should 
be protected and how computer technology affects privacy. In other words, the 
morality of individual, organizational, and societal actions is evaluated. What is 
ignored in these debates is the business implication of privacy and how this shapes 
information security activity within organizations.  
Security research, on the other hand, focuses on the threat of attack by hackers or 
malware, and the tools and technical solutions available to address these threats. 
The need to develop secure architectures or build applications that avoid security 
pitfalls, whilst important, mostly does not address the way in which such decisions 
affect privacy. 
This chapter, therefore, seeks to straddle these two fields to show how organizations 
need to take privacy into account as a business issue in order that this shapes infor-
mation security policies and practice. To achieve this we draw on the experiences 
of one small-medium enterprise (SME). The formal definition of SMEs varies from 
country to country, but for the purposes of this chapter we have defined SMEs as 
employing less than 500 people. This definition does not mean that the lessons are 
not applicable to larger organizations but that the focus of the study, and data drawn 
from previous studies, matches this definition.
The remainder of this chapter begins by outlining why privacy is a business is-
sue, recognising the financial and legal imperatives organizations face. Current 
security policies and practices in SMEs worldwide are then reviewed highlighting 
the weaknesses currently evident in the way that SMEs approach their information 
security. 
The focus of the chapter is a case study based on ABC Awards Ltd, a small UK-based 
assessment body who offers vocational qualifications through a variety of learning 
centres. The study relates to their development of an enterprise-wide information 
system and underpinning infrastructure. Policy and practice were developed to 
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support the business security needs in line with the legal and commercial need for 
protection of privacy of personal data. The analysis is structured to focus on people 
and organizational issues, and on technical issues, to show the inter-relationship 
between these aspects of information security management. 
Privacy.as.a.Business.Issue
The violation of privacy through computer technology is often related to acts of 
snooping on individuals. Edgar (2003) gives examples of how computers have been 
used to identify potential prospective sales targets, verify the status of debtors’ bank 
accounts, and find out about the activities of customers. These examples show how 
organizations are seen to invade privacy in order to make business decisions based 
upon private data. Moor (2004) therefore calls for increased legal protection so as to 
reduce excess harm and risk to the individual at the expense of the organization. 
Organizations are already under a clear legal obligation, at least in some countries, 
to protect private data and to use it only in accordance within defined guidelines. 
Laws on data protection have developed since the 1970s. France (2004) noted the 
way that the European Directive (95/46/EC) in 1995 produced harmonisation of 
these laws across Europe. The resulting laws supported the free flow of data between 
businesses in different parts of the continent as the Directive provided a standard 
level of protection. However, she also highlights that it was not the moral but the 
trade imperatives that led to the development of the initial UK Data Protection Act 
(1984). Previous parliamentary investigations had been less than convinced by the 
ethical cause. 
The current UK Data Protection Act (1998) is built upon eight principles that constrain 
the way that data is collected, processed, and stored. For example, organizations 
have to ensure the data is accurate, held only as long as necessary, not excessive, 
and secured. 
Elsewhere though, such as Australia, small businesses are exempt from privacy 
legislation. The US, too, has minimal legal protection for private data, with small 
business required to offer little security of data, and some make a profit from sell-
ing on that data. As a result some argue this leaves them “woefully behind” Europe 
(Tavani, 2004, p. 146). The US Government appears to side with business interests, 
who fear the cost of implementing data protection legislation would undermine 
economic efficiency. Tavani (2004) argues that this is alarmist and there is mini-
mal overhead as most US organizations operating in Europe have done so without 
profits suffering.  
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Indeed, on the contrary, it could be argued not paying appropriate attention to privacy 
could be a detriment to business profits. As Holmes (2006, p. 2) puts it, “carefully 
thought-out privacy controls make good business sense” as it has a considerable 
impact on sales. He shows how getting this right has been beneficial at Bell Canada. 
Microsoft also has recognised that it needs to ensure privacy as part of its prod-
ucts and services (Fleischer & Cooper, 2006). In areas related to Internet activity, 
Microsoft’s policies and practices have been overhauled to ensure compliance with 
the EU privacy rules. Fleischer and Cooper (2006) conclude by highlighting the 
importance of privacy for the business and the need to involve key stakeholders in 
decisions about privacy policy. 
There are though many examples of organizations who have suffered loss of profits 
as a result of under-mining customer privacy; the “size of the monetary penalty 
should fool no one” (Holmes, 2006, p. 1). Nissenbaum (2004) gives the example 
of Lotus Marketplace, a software package that brought together publicly available 
information about individuals in one system. The package was due to be launched 
by Lotus and Equifax in the early 1990s. They did not anticipate the level of public 
complaint: 30000 letters of protest were received. The package was withdrawn from 
the market.  Cartmanager, an online shopping cart software provider, broke its own 
privacy policy by selling customer data thereby infuriating both online users and 
the merchants who had incorporated the software on their Web sites; their reputa-
tion was damaged for some time (Holmes, 2006). Similarly, one of the UK’s largest 
banks, HSBC, found itself on the front page of national newspapers in August 2006 
because of a security loophole putting customer data at risk via its Internet bank-
ing systems requiring its CEO to write a strong rebuttal highlighting the potential 
impact of the article on its business (Guardian, 2006). 
As a consequence, organizations need to focus on ensuring customer trust. “Trust 
means stakeholders feel safe in the hands of these enterprises and are confident in 
the secure delivery of their products and services along with protection of their 
private information” (Reece, 2007, p. 1). Reece (2007) goes on to argue that trust 
must be earned through excellence of operations and leading edge information 
protection. Good information protection requires organizations to recognise the 
value of the information and develop policies accordingly. Good privacy polices 
should not be seen as a dam but as a finely tuned control valve allowing business 
to continue effectively whilst maintaining the integrity and security of personally 
valued data (Holmes, 2006).
The financial implications of a lack of trust are significant. For instance, e-commerce 
usage has stalled because of a lack of trust (Holmes, 2006). Internet users place great 
value on security measures that make identity theft less likely (Poindexter, Earp, & 
Baumer, 2006). At The Woolwich, a UK bank, security was seen as a critical ele-
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ment in their adoption of e-banking following the embarrassment suffered by their 
parent bank where security breaches led to huge media coverage (Shah & Siddiqui, 
2006). Low information security effectiveness could have wide-spread implications 
for competitive advantage: “the enormity of potential losses arising from IS security 
abuses should motivate them to raise their deterrent efforts so as to enhance there 
IS security effectiveness” (Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, & Wei, 2003, p. 152).  
So in summary, if a business was to inadvertently release private data then the dam-
age to the reputation and trust in the market that would have an immediate, and at 
least proportionate, impact on the business’s finance. Even ignoring the possibility 
of litigation, the loss of custom could be substantial. This risk is all the more likely 
where trust is a paramount element of the service provided, such as in financial or 
other personal service organizations. Organizations are aware of these risks to their 
business: it is already seen as a major constraint on the growth of e-business. On 
this basis then, security of systems should be considered from a customer privacy 
perspective, as well as ensuring business processing can be maintained.  
Security.Policy.and.Practice.in.SMEs
The growth of e-business has increased the criticality of any security incidents, 
mounting risks to privacy through new forms of attack, and the legal implications 
of breaches. Large organizations therefore have become far more aware of the need 
to take action to address the security risks arising from using information systems, 
resulting in a drop in the number of incidents (DTI, 2006). Previous studies, however, 
(e.g., Kankanhalli et al., 2003) have shown that small businesses are less likely to 
address this issue and are ignorant of the technologies available. Such organizations 
have become more vulnerable therefore to the threats relating to their information 
systems and have seen a rise in incidents. 
Equally, the security of business transactions and personal data is not simply de-
pendent upon the security of the network. From a survey of SMEs in Hong Kong, 
Chung and Tang (1999) conclude security management is an important success 
factor for the adoption of information systems in SMEs. So as new customer-based 
information systems are designed, developed, procured and deployed the privacy 
related security issues of the information system need careful consideration. 
With the increasing use of the Internet and mobile technologies by smaller orga-
nizations, enabling them to be more flexible and diverse in their operations, the 
threats are broadening. Effective security management is therefore essential for all 
organizations in this increasingly interoperable world in order to ensure that the 
   Allison & Strangwick
Copyright © 2008, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission      
of IGI Global is prohibited.
information remains confidential, available and retains integrity. Yet, Chang and 
Ho (2006) found the smaller business is likely to be less effective in the application 
of critical factors outlined in the security management standard ISO17799 with 
smaller organizations resisting making investments in this area. Here then we will 
review the extent of the issue. 
Gupta and Hammond (2005) undertook a survey of SMEs in the USA. Their findings 
provides an insight into current information security practice within small busi-
nesses based on questionnaires drawn from organizations across a variety of sectors, 
including services, construction, utilities and finance. Keller, Powell, Horstmann, 
Predmore, and Crawford (2005), similarly, interviewed 18 system administrators 
in small businesses to evaluate systems security practice. Their findings provide a 
more personalized view from network professionals working in small organizations. 
There is a natural difference between these findings resulting from the variation in 
the type of samples: network specialists will be intrinsically more knowledgeable 
than the average SME manager. Below, these data sets are used to evaluate SMEs’ 
security management policies and their use of security technologies.
Security.Management.Policies
Table 1 summarises level of adoption of security management policies by small 
businesses. The levels of planning and policy definition are low in comparison to 
larger organizations. Only 41 percent of small businesses have written a security 
policy that will protect customer privacy (Gupta & Hammond, 2005) in comparison 
to 76 percent of large organizations (Fulford & Doherty, 2003). The reasons for this 
difference relate to expertise, resources, and an understanding of the risk. 
Table 1. Policies and procedures currently in place (adapted from Gupta and Ham-
mond, 2005) 
Document % of respondents
Data recovery procedures 47
Computer use and misuse policy 43
Information security policy 41
Information security procedures 33
Business continuity plan 24
Data destruction procedures 21
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SMEs lack the skills, knowledge and experience that would give the understanding 
and necessary motivation to develop comprehensive security policies (Gupta & 
Hammond, 2005). With little perception of the risks, managers focus their atten-
tion to other business priorities. It is difficult to overcome the lack of knowledge 
as small businesses often do not have the financial resource to hire consultants to 
address the skills gap. 
The result of these resource constraints is more evident in some areas of security 
policy than others. Some types of planning activities such as data destruction pro-
cedures and business continuity planning are particularly low. However, privacy is 
especially vulnerable if obsolete data is not destroyed effectively or during a crisis 
situation, where it may be deemed a lower priority than recovering the systems. 
Security professionals are more aware of these needs; Keller et al. (2005) found 50 
percent of the companies interviewed had an emergency action plan and a further 
third had begun to develop one. However, they too found the quality of the plan 
was variable as the plans ranged from simple back up procedures to a full disaster 
recovery plan including copies of working machines at another site. With the empha-
sis being placed on the policies and procedures for security rather than on handling 
the situation in the event of an incident, unforeseen problems related to the loss or 
inadvertent disclosure of private data could easily occur in the moment of crisis. 
Security.Technologies
Whilst power surge protectors and back up systems were the most used technologies 
(Table 2), small organizations are generally most concerned about viruses (Gupta 
& Hammond, 2005). So the majority seek to protect themselves through anti-virus 
Table 2. Security technologies in use (adapted from Gupta & Hammond, 2005)
Technology % of respondents
Power surge protectors 79
Data back up systems 65
Anti-virus 57
Firewalls 43
Redundant systems 35
Intrusion detection system 25
Security evaluation systems 9
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software. Keller et al. (2005) found that the systems administrators were less con-
cerned about virus attacks, with only about a quarter of their interviewees believing 
that viruses were a major threat. This lower concern may be because they had taken 
action to militate against such problems by implementing an anti-virus tool and 
appropriate management policies. All the systems administrators had implemented 
some form of firewall, two thirds of which were a hardware solution. 
Employees often are considered to be a major threat, either due to malicious at-
tack or unintentional action. Trim (2005) highlights that hacking by internal staff 
is a growing problem, with a suggested figure of one third of hacking incidents 
resulting from internal activity. Privacy of data should not though be thought of in 
relation to security from external attack, but by ensuring integrity of data from all 
forms of unauthorised access and corruption (Spinello, 2000). So, integrity of the 
data requires that those who have a right to access the data can do when they need 
it, so as to be able to process business or make appropriate decisions based on that 
data, for instance. 
Privacy of personal data can be put at risk by poor practice or premeditated action 
by employees. Gupta and Hammond’s (2005) respondents, however, considered 
insider access abuse was of least concern. Whether this is because of the higher level 
of trust resulting from a perceived employee commitment or due to the ignorance 
of the business managers is difficult to say. What is evident is that, in contrast, the 
system administrators regarded internal personnel as the primary threat (56 percent 
of respondents) (Keller et al., 2005). 
So, in summary, SMEs have tended to adopt off-the-shelf security technologies in 
the expectation that these will suffice in the protection of their business data and 
therefore the privacy of their client base. This ignorance leaves them vulnerable to 
the release of private information through either malicious attack or poor manage-
ment practice. The business implications are similarly significant whatever causes 
the breach of privacy and client trust.
Small businesses therefore need to reevaluate their policies and procedures, and 
change their security technology, to be more effective in dealing with actual se-
curity concerns (Gupta & Hammond, 2005). The absence of such policies makes 
organizations more vulnerable to internal or external attack, and therefore a breach 
of privacy. 
Small businesses should take better preventative measures so that the information 
remains confidential, available and retains integrity. The remainder of the chapter 
outlines how one small business set about changing the security culture to protect 
its business and the privacy of its clients, highlighting the lessons that other orga-
nizations might draw from this case. 
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Case.Study.
Company.Background:.ABC.Awards
ABC Awards is a national awarding body, accredited by the Qualifications and Cur-
riculum Authority (QCA) to develop and offer vocational qualifications eligible for 
public funding. ABC was formed through a consortium of four regional awarding 
bodies by pooling their existing qualifications and resources in order to compete 
with larger companies such as Edexcel, and City and Guilds. ABC is a non-for-
profit company and although it receives no public funding most of its customers 
are publicly funded.
ABC award qualifications across a number of fields, such as in skill-based trades 
like welding, hobbies such as flower arranging and art, or general life skills such as 
foreign languages. The development of qualifications includes liaising with subject 
specialists, training providers, and sector skills councils and employers to determine 
programmes of study that meet the UK skills needs and then writing specifications 
for units and qualifications. The business currently has over 500 qualifications, and 
at any one time up to 200 under development, reflecting the pace of change in the 
UK skills market.
Accredited qualifications are offered to over 1,400 colleges, universities and pri-
vate training providers. The services to customers include administering the whole 
process from registrations to certification as well as quality assuring the delivery of 
learning, the provision of tutor support and specifications for coursework and exams, 
external assessment and moderation of candidates work and certificate production. 
Data sharing services also are provided to the various government departments as 
a condition of national accreditation status.
Within ABC, the organization records 500,000 enrolments per annum to their 
qualifications from candidates at the various centres of study. The required confi-
dentiality of the data is high as the database contains sensitive personal data related 
to the studies (covered under the UK Data Protection Act) and company financial 
data related to payments for the assessments. The privacy issues relate to physical 
representations of the data (e.g., candidate transcripts, certificates) as well as the 
electronic, and with the distributed nature of the business the issues relate to securing 
the data in all potential locations. Privacy of candidate data was acknowledged as 
a strategic priority given that a small lapse could result in significant loss of busi-
ness in a saturated market, where reputation is a vital component for qualification 
providers competing fiercely to win and retain market share.
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As a non-for-profit entity with the stated objectives of contributing to the UK education 
system, ABC is actively involved in many partnerships including the development of 
new national diplomas, and various Government collaboration projects involved in 
reducing bureaucracy and duplication across the education sector. ABC also has in 
the past entered into partnerships with related private sector service providers such 
as authors of study guides and learning resources that can accompany its qualifica-
tions when being sold to colleges. 
The four regions each have their own offices and local area network. Each regional 
body runs as a separate business in addition to the ABC activities. ABC operates as a 
stand-alone commercial entity. It is therefore necessary to maintain legally separated 
networks whilst providing the necessary inter-connectivity for the personnel.
The business employs approximately 50 staff members located across the four regional 
offices. Functions include business development, marketing, ICT systems, finance 
and administration, with approximately half of staff involved in administration and 
customer support. In addition the business has over 700 contractors involved in 
development and delivery. Roles include consultants, lead examiners, script mark-
ers, question authors, and visiting moderators. A small number of personnel work 
from home or travel extensively so need remote access. 
Systems.
ABC has an internal development function that recently replaced the individual legacy 
systems of the four member organizations.  In response to the strategic need to create 
an enterprise-wide awards management system, a project was established to create 
a new software and hardware architecture, supported by appropriate information 
management practices. The company has deployed a wide area network capable of 
supporting the short term and high priority business processing requirement. The 
network connects the four offices to servers located in Nottingham which hosts 
the company’s bespoke Awards Management System (AMS) used for transaction 
processing and document production. 
Table 3. Principles adopted to ensure security of data
Security Management Policy Development Security Practice
Organizational Issues
Manage risks End user education
Total cost of ownership Least privilege access
Technical Issues
Develop security policies Defence in depth
Use of external resources Monitoring of systems
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The company also has recently introduced an e-commerce Web site that takes regis-
trations data from colleges and integrates with the AMS. ABC recently outsourced 
its email and collaboration systems with an externally hosted Microsoft Exchange 
Server.
The current systems development strategy is based on further extending the services 
to customers with more features available online and a staged move towards e-as-
sessment and support for e-learning including real-time online invoicing, on-screen 
results entry, support for electronic portfolios and e-moderation and on-screen 
testing.
This chapter does not detail all of this work, but focuses on the way that privacy 
issues shaped the approach to security, and how security was designed into each area 
of the system. Our policy throughout was to ensure privacy of data by ensuring the 
system and organization were secure from accidental, deliberate and opportunistic 
attack. The security policy was based on the international information security 
standard for best practice (ISO17799). The practices were relevant to ABC partner 
companies, and capable of being implemented by most SMEs. 
The approach taken can be categorised into issues focused on addressing people 
and organizational aspects of ensuring security, and the technical underpinning to 
support those needs. The following sections are organized on this basis highlighting 
how for each aspect the policies were formed and put into practice. Table 3 outlines 
the principles adopted and discussed below. 
It will be shown that organizations need to understand the real risks and build 
security management policies on them; evaluate technological solutions and ex-
ternal hosting decisions on the total cost of ownership; build systems with defence 
in depth where the first line of defence is users who are aware of the issues; and 
to minimise the chance of unauthorised access by defaulting to a policy of least 
privilege access and monitoring the network to maintain confidence to ensure the 
security policy is working.  
Organizational.Issues:.Policy.and.Practice
Manage.Business.and.Security.Risks
Undertaking e-business is a considerable risk: interruption of financial transactions, 
revealing sensitive data or intellectual property to competitors, or logistics infor-
mation can be used to disrupt normal distribution operations (Shih & Wen, 2005). 
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Organizations need to invest in information security measures to ensure security 
incidents do not undermine the advantages that the technology brings, especially 
across e-business operations. The threat of security breaches hinder the expansion 
in e-business (Fulford & Doherty, 2003). New technologies increase this concern; 
wireless communications and mobile devices are now integral elements of the sup-
ply chain. The benefits of such technologies also are their biggest vulnerabilities: 
network exposure and rogue access can be achieved without need for physical access 
to the network infrastructure (Shih & Wen, 2005). 
 So, the information security professional should always assume that the systems will 
at some time be compromised and therefore plan appropriate defences and recovery 
strategies. Their key task is how to avoid, mitigate, and manage the risks that this 
places on the business. So, security managers need to be risk aware. Kankanhalli et 
al. (2003), however, found that SMEs applied fewer security deterrents than larger 
organizations. Yet, where greater deterrents and preventative measures were applied 
by organizations then greater information security effectiveness resulted. To judge 
the survivability of an organization’s systems it is necessary to judge the level of 
disruption caused to essential services as a result of any incident (Redman, Warren, 
& Hutchinson, 2005). For system survivability it is necessary to ensure protection 
against threats and quick response to the effects when one occurs. 
Early in the requirements engineering phase of the project, information privacy was 
considered as a key requirement for the system and a risk analysis was conducted 
in line with the recommendations of ISO17799 to determine the high priority risks 
that needed to be considered. Prior to this project, as with many small businesses, 
risk analysis was not a mature, evolving process within the business but more of an 
ad-hoc tool used after the event or a paper based exercise used to satisfy regulators 
or requirements for a continuous improvement program. 
Risk analysis began by clearly understanding what information security means, 
ISO7799 defines information security as the preservation of information confiden-
tially, integrity and availability. The high level system and user requirements were 
then considered against these categories to determine security requirements for the 
new system. 
It is important in such analysis to ensure the risks are based on actual, rather than 
perceived, threats. So, previous incidents that had occurred across the business’s 
systems over recent years were analysed before considering the planned systems 
and any additional risks that would result from the implementation. Previously, 
the perceived risk to confidentiality had been focused on unauthorized access and 
theft of data, and loss of data and systems through virus infection. These are not to 
be dismissed, but the historical analysis showed that most incidents had concerned 
information integrity and availability. Also upon resolution of information avail-
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ability problems, an information integrity problem was common and related to the 
loss of availability. 
Incidents affecting information integrity included corrupt database files and docu-
ments through unplanned outages and failure of UPS, data processing errors through 
lack of training and incorrect software functions. There had been no reports of un-
authorized access or theft of data and incidents of infection by virus were minor and 
resolved easily by updating virus definitions and removing the virus before any real 
damage had been done. However, the business was aware that this risk to personal 
data could not be ignored as it moved towards an integrated e-business solution 
that would enable transactions to be processed across the regions and eventually 
direct by assessment centres. 
Total.Cost.of.Ownership.
SMEs do not have a culture of security management and have tended to resist the 
need to invest in information security technologies and practices (Giannacopoulos, 
2002). Indeed, Gupta and Hammond (2005) found that a variety of international 
surveys highlighted that nearly half of organizations stated budget considerations as 
the reason for poor security procedures and implementation. However, this culture 
is slowly changing as managers realize that even the smallest business is becoming 
prone to attack (Giannacopoulos, 2002).  
Even where organizations are willing to invest in physical security devices such as 
firewalls, many small companies struggle to appreciate the return on investment for 
an integrated security policy. The reason for this in part is due to marketing within 
the IT security industry, with vendors marketing products as a single solution to 
security, but products can only be as good as the configurations and the configura-
tions only as good as the policies they implement.
One way to overcome this perception is by moving to a financial model that uses 
total cost of ownership (TCO), or life-time cost, as the basis for making judgments. 
Many small businesses are not familiar with the concept of TCO and frequently 
make decisions based on the purchase price alone or purchase price plus some well 
understood maintenance costs. The broader organizational costs, such as inability to 
process business, loss of client trust, loss of data integrity or confidentiality, should 
be part of the costing model. Security threats might devastate an organization’s finan-
cial position with single incidents often costing more than £30,000 (approximately 
US $60000) and occasionally as much as £500,000 (US $1m) (Shih & Wen, 2005). 
Only by being aware of these costs will managers recognize the potential savings 
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of their investment in an overall security infrastructure. So as well as using these 
broad outline costs, security managers need to estimate the cost of impact on their 
own enterprise and in the event of an incident calculate the actual cost as a way of 
evidencing the value of preventative measures.
By understanding how well the security supports the overall business objectives 
or the risk involved in each solution then management are able to make more in-
formed decisions. Also, due to the high degree of coupling involved in networks 
and software layers there are many other costs to be considered even when simply 
adding a firewall. These include the cost of impact on existing systems and any re-
configuration that may need to be done, impact on future upgrades to the network, 
increased use of network resources, bandwidth and power, more points of failure 
in the network, additional insurance. 
One example of the use of total cost of ownership at ABC was in the selection of 
firewalls. Identifying the overall cost and benefits of the various options meant as-
sessing different combinations of firewalls. Issues considered in the decision included 
the level of capability of particular technologies; how selection of vendors could 
improve the bundled costing; whether the technology would require consultancy 
support due to the level of complexity; and the long-term availability support and 
trouble shooting. So, in terms of the costs, it was the whole solution, not just parts, 
that was measured, so taking into account support factors, staff costs, dependency 
and impact (e.g., implications for other new purchases), ongoing monitoring and 
support, and the risk of downtime or breach of confidentiality. 
Least.Privilege.Access
Many security incidents are caused by user error when the user has inappropriate 
access to systems. In SMEs, there generally is poor user account management, for 
example, active user accounts for staff that have left, unrestricted remote access 
and local user accounts. These vulnerabilities provide easy targets for hacking or 
malware intrusion to go un-noticed. Policies were created whereby members of 
the consortium agreed to ensure that a named member of staff was accountable for 
account creation and deletion. 
While least privilege access is an ideal to aim for, implementing it in an SME is usu-
ally very difficult as default access is usually the norm. Previously at ABC all users 
could do anything. In order to move from one extreme to the other, new systems 
being deployed can begin to follow a methodology whereby all users begin with very 
limited access whilst learning and training and then progress through security levels 
in a structured manner. Access privileges were changed in the design of the network 
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and the enterprise-wide awards management application. For example, application 
permission rules were defined based on roles such as a “centre administrator” and 
granting of the permissions to individuals is administered by authorized users. The 
advantage of this approach is that it protects staff from mistakes and unintended 
privacy infringement. 
For the design of the application detailed task analysis during the requirements stage 
enabled permissions to be defined clearly prior to implementation. For each type of 
record being stored by the system the four basic operations (create, read, update, 
delete) were used to define the permissions on each area. As part of the solution, 
ABC recognized and considered the trade-off between the need to make the system 
secure but not at the expense of making the roles of the employees so difficult that 
they could not operate effectively. 
End.User.Education
Earlier we noted that employees are a significant risk to the security of the business. 
End users pose a threat to a company both through intended and unintended actions. 
In addition to deliberate attack, end users also provide a risk through their actions 
and ignorance. It therefore is logical to assume this would be addressed through 
employee training and awareness. However, Keller et al. (2005) note that surveys 
show that training and awareness were the lowest on the list of priorities for compa-
nies. Users, though, also are your best ally in detecting problems and are therefore 
the first layer in the defence. They can spot problems early. To enable employees 
to assist in the defence of the network, managers need to share more information 
relating to attacks, malware, and other vulnerabilities.  
A survey by Ernst and Young in 2001 (cited in Fulford & Doherty, 2003, p. 107), 
however, found that the dissemination of organizational security policies and knowl-
edge to employees is a low priority. The reason for this lack of dissemination is a 
lack of trust in the employees. Managers perceive that there is a risk from malicious 
employees as well as the possibility of anyone being approached and coerced by 
outside agencies. Also, “managers are reluctant to share or divulge sensitive and in 
many cases confidential data and information. This is because unnecessary leaks 
can result in inappropriate publicity for the organization that has been targeted by 
hackers or organized crime syndicates” (Trim, 2005, p. 494).
The development of usage policies is essential to both educate staff and protect 
the employer. However, policies are insufficient as a vehicle for education. Direct 
communication of defined policies and practices to all employees is necessary to 
ensure they become more knowledgeable about the risks involved. 
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The approach used at ABC was three-fold. Firstly the organization sought to raise 
awareness and understanding of the issues. It then provided alternative methods that 
could be used to achieve the same business goals. Finally, it re-configured systems 
and changed some policies to make it less likely that the practice would continue. 
One example issue was Internet usage. Activities such as the receipt of e-mail and 
downloading materials from the Internet had become a major risk. These were ad-
dressed through security policies and technology, but making users aware of the risks 
was essential. User training began with awareness of the issues including information 
on high and low probability and high and low impact Internet threats. The concept 
of trusted and non-trusted sources was discussed, as well as high level principles of 
packet filtering, firewalls, and malicious code. Next users were trained on the safe 
use of the Internet and e-mail, for example the opening of attachments that are not 
from trusted sources, browsing safe and restricted sites, and managing their own 
security settings after making informed decisions about the threats. Permissions were 
then changed on the network with administration rights being removed to reduce 
the potential for intrusion by spyware in the event of an intrusion occurring. 
In summary the organizational issues are: 
• Ensuring that risk management is core to the ongoing privacy of client data. Risk 
management should be based on actual rather then perceived risks, therefore 
historical analysis of incidents should be monitored. At ABC this identified 
the need to focus on data integrity and availability as well as unauthorized 
access.
• Security selection and justification should be based on the total cost of ownership 
that models in the potential cost of loss of client data privacy or integrity. 
• Ensure personnel access and education policies focus on the business implica-
tions of the erosion of privacy and therefore trust. In an SME end user staff 
can be a vital part of the security of the system as well as a potential risk.
Technical.Issues:.Policy.and.Practice
Security.Policies
As discussed above, the literature shows that small businesses are less likely to have 
security policies than larger businesses, and where policies do exist the quality of 
those policies varies significantly. Fulford and Doherty (2003, p.106) recognize 
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that effective information security management is “predicated on the formulation, 
dissemination and operation of an information security policy.” They report that 
whilst the importance of security policies is well understood, many surveys show 
that there is a low level of uptake and the policies that do exist are often inadequate. 
Many smaller organizations focus on the technical solutions, but Trim (2005) shows 
that policy and technological solutions go hand-in-hand. 
Changes in technological solutions should be based upon a security policy. Without 
a policy, security practices will be undertaken without any clear strategy, purpose or 
common understanding. So important is this area of management that there is now 
an international standard (IS0 17799) that states the principal tenants of informa-
tion security management policies, such as ensuring that the policy is aligned to 
business objectives.  
In line with the section above, a starting point to developing policy is to start with 
risk assessment; specifically identifying those risks and likely causes that could 
compromise the information systems availability, confidentiality or integrity. One 
survey found that organizations ranked this as the second most important factor af-
fecting the success of information security policy, after management commitment 
(Fulford & Doherty, 2003).
In an SME the risk management activity also can be used to address some of the 
other key factors related to understanding security requirements and communicat-
ing the policy to employees. By involving the organization’s management team in 
developing the risk assessment they are made aware of how the business objectives 
and priorities are related to security. 
The process of developing a security policy is an educational experience for a small 
business, and will bring a higher level of awareness and understanding; these are 
Table 4. Policies developed at ABC
Policies Developed at ABC Awards
Organizational security policy: business priorities and responsibilities; the ABC infrastructure 
including all significant hardware and networks from an ABC user workstation to the ABC servers 
and backup device; the system users and types of services that each requires; the different services 
and protocols that need to be supported by the systems and infrastructure. 
Access and permissions: the authentication and access controls required.
Service level agreements: systems availability and response times; agreed minimum standards at 
each regional office in order to connect to the systems.
End user policy: use and misuse rules 
Archiving: destruction of obsolete and retention of historical data 
Data recovery: data Back up and recovery; business continuity plans and decision protocols in the 
event of incidents; testing procedure
Monitoring: policy for checking for activity and utilization on network and servers.
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essential if the business requires the higher level skills in application that are needed 
to implement security measures. Implementing any security measures without an 
underlying policy will lead to problems in both understanding and configuration. 
Policies are not fixed and should be revisited as part of the regular review and control 
process. Each policy should state what the review cycle is and the responsibilities for 
undertaking that review. The reviews at ABC are informed by current experience, 
business changes or future plans, and new technologies or known good practice.  
External.Resources
As we recognised earlier, small businesses can lack the knowledge and skills to 
ensure the security of their systems. There are, though, many sources of assistance 
available for small businesses. Some of this may come at a cost, if it is necessary to 
engage consultants with specific knowledge of products and systems. ABC, though, 
took advice from many free or relatively cheap sources by attending relevant confer-
ences and workshops, working with a local university, and discussing options with 
vendors in pre-sales activity. Knowledge was developed by discussing concepts, 
technologies and policy decisions.
When developing procurement strategies it is important to understand the location 
of value in different types of products and services. For a large company the location 
of value in a service might be the economy of scale it provides for cost reduction 
whilst for a smaller company it may be the ease of implementation.
External hosting of business applications in state of the art data centres is becom-
ing popular for companies without existing skills to manage servers and firewalls 
and can be cost effective when the total cost is considered. Alternatively, in-house 
management can be more cost effective for bespoke requirements if existing skills 
are available and the scalability is not too large. Both approaches can be used by 
selecting the functions to outsource.
For the SME, hosting e-mail and Web site services internally are sometimes con-
sidered as a low cost option but this is based on several incorrect assumptions and 
lack of understanding of the TCO. There sometimes is a desire to increase utilization 
of existing investments in servers and this drives the decision to host on existing 
equipment. Many SMEs assume that if they have purchased a server and it has 
spare disk space then hosting e-mail services on it is beneficial as it makes use of 
spare capacity and reduces costs. The problem is that this approach reduces the 
redundancy in the server and increases the risks. 
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Defence.in.Depth
Security is an ongoing and normal concern when offices use interconnected IT 
systems. SMEs should define their boundaries and ensure the security on that pe-
rimeter because vulnerability at one office is capable of being exploited to allow 
unauthorized access to another office. Often organizations have inadequate firewall 
management and any physical security measures are often circumvented to suit the 
business and staff. 
At ABC, the first objective was the deployment of an Intranet capable of supporting 
the short term and high priority business processing requirements for employees at 
each regional office. ABC used Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections between 
the offices. So it was decided that all communications taking place over public 
infrastructure (Internet) should be encrypted between the two network perimeters 
using industry strength IPSec. For a site to site connection this was done between 
the host firewall/VPN appliance and the client sites firewall. In this case the users 
Figure 1. Defence in depth: Network security
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are known and can be validated. The defence of the network was designed so that 
it was protected at different levels, as shown in Figure 1. 
Due to the costs of wide area network infrastructure, users at the remote offices 
needed to access the system by routing requests over the public, un-trusted Internet. 
The systems also needed to send potentially confidential information back to users 
over the same un-trusted Internet. This was protected using current industry standard 
tunnelling and encryption protocols.
The ABC firewall was implemented in two levels, the first level for packet level 
inspection and the second level for application level inspection. A global access 
schedule was implemented on the packet level firewall so that all traffic is blocked 
during specific times. The ABC application level firewall was capable user level 
account management, thus only allowing access for authorised users. Additionally, 
the application server was designed to perform user level authentication. The au-
thentication was performed transparently to avoid the user having to re-enter their 
username and password. 
Monitoring.of.Systems
Misconfiguration of security devices is common in SME’s due to the skills needed 
to translate a written security policy into a set of unambiguous firewall rules. SMEs 
typically invest in the security device but not the required configuration and testing. 
Regular monitoring and hardening of the servers and network became a normal 
part of the network administrator’s tasks. Similarly, as the application vulnerability 
is more important, arguably, the application audit logs are checked, and security 
features are retested with new releases. 
Monitoring of access logs gave confidence that the security policy was both correctly 
defined and implemented thereby ensuring the ongoing confidentiality of client 
data. This process also helped to identify areas of the policy that needed clarifying 
and changing. A key part of the monitoring is testing. Attempting to gain access to 
services that should not be allowed, and then checking the access logs, enabled areas 
of the company’s security policy that were not implemented properly to be found. 
Policies and technical solutions are not all-time solutions. They are evolving in line 
with business needs, perceived threats to privacy, new technologies and known 
good practice.  In doing this monitoring it provides ongoing information to the 
senior management about the value of their investment, and areas that need further 
investment. 
So in summary, the technical issues are:
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• Development of a security policy that can be used to support the technological 
decisions so that client confidentiality, data integrity, and system availability 
are maintained.
• Use of appropriate external resources to help improve business resilience 
against the threat of a breach of privacy.
• Design the systems so that they are secured at the boundaries and at different 
levels thereby reducing the business vulnerability to a loss of client trust.
• Monitor the system for potential breaches of confidentiality and adjust the 
policies and technical solutions accordingly.  
Conclusion.
Whilst privacy legal obligations vary from country to country, organizations have a 
financial, as well as moral, motive to minimize the chance of an inadvertent release 
of private data. This case is a contrast to practice in many SMEs that leave many 
risks unmanaged and bring little benefit other than protection from well understood 
and low probability risks. A key lesson from this case is that privacy needs to be 
understood from a business perspective: a breach of client confidentiality can have 
a significant impact on the reputation and therefore the income of an organization. 
Dealing with information security as a core business issue provides greater confi-
dence that data privacy will be maintained.
Client information security needs to be at the forefront of the design of the archi-
tecture and the applications. Too often security is considered as an add-on feature 
after the initial developments, and therefore it is difficult to achieve. As was shown 
here, security management for SMEs is required from the early stages of systems 
development through risk assessment and then designing solutions that can evolve 
over time. Focusing on it from the beginning meant the purchase and development 
decisions were informed by surfacing the organizational risks and priorities, as well 
as the technical or functional requirements, thus providing the agility to respond to 
business level decisions without compromising the security.  
In the assessment of risk, information security managers should plan for a breach of 
the system not just try to minimise the threat. The risks can inform the development 
of a range of policies, which should be evolving documents that reflect the ongoing 
nature of the business and the risks it faces. Policies and business priorities should 
shape the selection of security solutions and decisions on external hosting, but a 
final solution will encompass a mixture of technologies that needs to be evaluated 
by looking at the total cost of ownership. 
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Defence in depth gives the SME the ability to implement a comprehensive security 
policy within a constrained budget by defining multiple areas to focus efforts. Ad-
ditional benefits are that the organization can use the approach to start a process of 
continuous improvement. The first line of defence is a knowledgeable user. User 
training is a vital element of the implementation process, as a change of culture is 
often required in small businesses. 
Further work is required at three levels to build on this case study. In the company 
there is need to assess the impact of the approach adopted over time to ensure the 
business benefits were as anticipated. In the industry, we need to recognise the way 
that privacy issues are potentially business critical, and apply the lessons from this 
case elsewhere to test if the concepts are transferable. Finally, researchers should pay 
more attention to information security in SMEs as these are potentially the weakest 
link in the e-business supply chain. In particular, further codification of knowledge 
from other examples of good practice should be developed that are useful for other 
businesses, and in due course seek a common body of knowledge for information 
security in SMEs. 
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